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Abstract: Since the 1970s, women have been increasingly integrated into the military; in Iraq and Afghanistan many women served
on the frontline in combat. This article argues women’s integration has been facilitated by the all-volunteer professional forces in
which individuals are judged purely by competence. Female soldiers
have been accepted in all military roles if they perform competently.
There are serious limitations in the infantry, however, as only a small
number of women pass the selection tests and it is likely no more
than one percent of the infantry could be female at present. Moreover, masculine prejudices abound and women are still the victims
of discrimination, harassment, and abuse.

T

he accession of women into the United States combat arms,
announced on 24 January 2013 by Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta following a unanimous decision by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has been welcomed by many. The decision, however, remains controversial and there are some who oppose it. Indeed, Martin van Creveld,
a long-standing opponent of female integration, has anticipated some
arguments that opponents of integration may use. Van Creveld claims
that not only are male soldiers “often obliged to undertake additional
hardship in order to compensate for women’s physical weakness” but
because women are weaker, “for them [men] to undergo military training
and serve alongside women represents a humiliation.”1 For van Creveld,
the inclusion of women into the armed forces corrodes the bonds
among male soldiers, vitiating the honor of service. Indeed, David Frum,
a contributing editor of Newsweek recently rejected Panetta’s ruling on
similar grounds. Citing Kingsley Browne’s work Co-ed Combat: The New
Evidence That Women Shouldn’t Fight the Nation’s Wars, Frum argues that
women are too weak physically to perform as combat soldiers and they
undermine the cohesiveness of all-male groups. Even women who are
strong enough to serve in combat present a problem because the armed
forces, focused on war-winning (not employment equality), are unable to
apply gender-blind standards to women; they cannot treat them equally
and tend to be too lenient. If van Creveld, Browne, and Frum are right,
Leon Panetta and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made a serious mistake.
It is pertinent and perhaps necessary to assess the issue of female
accession. Drawing on archival research, and interview and fieldwork
research in Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the United States,2
this article attempts to identify the conditions most likely to expedite
the successful integration of women into the combat arms following Panetta’s announcement—and to highlight likely obstacles and

1     Martin van Creveld, “Less Than We Can Be: Men, Women and the Modern Military” Journal
of Strategic Studies 23, no. 4 (2000): 12, 13.
2     Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First
Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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problems.3 Precisely because it represents the most complex example,
the question of the possibility of female accession to the infantry, the
most demanding military occupation, is the focus of my examination.

The Possibility of Integration

Van Creveld’s objections and the general opposition to women in
combat are based on a presumption that a traditional form of masculinity
remains essential to the armed forces as an organization. There is little
doubt that masculinity has been central to the performance of armies
in the past. Indeed, the social sciences have explored the connection
between manhood and combat performance. In their famous article on
the Wehrmacht, Morris Janowitz and Edward Shils ascribed the extraordinary performance of this doomed army to the intense personal male
bonds within the primary military group: “spatial proximity, capacity
for intimate communication, the provision of paternal protectiveness
by NCOs and junior officers, and the gratification of certain personality
needs, e.g., manliness, by the military organization and its activities”
were critical to performance.4 Indeed, Sam Stouffer in his study of US
soldiers in the Second World War concurred, concluding that “combat
posed a challenge for a man to prove himself to himself and others.”5
Masculinity was a key motivating factor used to encourage solidarity on
the line and “the man who lived up to the code of the combat soldier
had proved his manhood.”6
Masculinity has been an important factor in cohesion and combat
motivation, yet it would be a mistake to be insensitive to historic transformations. The classical studies of cohesion from the 1940s to 1970s
were not necessarily flawed but it is critical to remember they analyzed
mass citizen armies in existence at the time. Such forces are now rare
in the west. Canada and the United Kingdom abolished conscription in
early 1945 and 1960 respectively. The United States abolished national
service in 1973 following the debacle in Vietnam, as did the Australians.
Conscription was retained in most of Europe until the end of the Cold
War, but in an increasingly attenuated form.7 Since then, all major
European powers have abolished national service including, finally,
Germany in 2011. Many scholars have observed the profound reformation of civil-military relations implied by the move to all-volunteer
forces but the development of professionalism has great significance
for military culture itself and especially for cohesion even down to the
3     This article is based on a wider comparative research project. See Anthony King, The Combat
Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013), Chapter 11; Economic and Social Research Council, “Combat, Cohesion and Gender,”
ESRC Grant ES/J006645/1.
4     Morris Janowitz and Edward Shils, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World
War II,” Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1948): 280-315.
5     Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, Vol II: Combat and Its Aftermath. (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), 131, 134.
6     Ibid., 134. See also Gideon Aran, “Parachuting,” American Journal of Sociology 80, no. 1 (July
1974): 123-52; William Arkin and Lynne R. Dobrofksy, “Military Socialization and Masculinity,”
Journal of Social Issues 34, no. 1 (Winter 1978): 151-66; Donna Winslow, The Canadian Airborne Regiment:
A Socio-Cultural Inquiry (Ottawa, Canada: Minister of Public Works and Government Services,
Canada, 1997).
7     See Catherine Kelleher, “Mass Armies in the 1970s: The Debate in Western Europe,” Armed
Forces & Society 5, no. 1 (Fall 1978): 3-30; Michel L. Martin, “Conscription and the Decline of the
Mass Army in France, 1960-75,” Armed Forces & Society 3, no. 3 (Spring 1977): 355-406; Karl W.
Haltiner, “The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe?” Armed Forces & Society 25, no.
1 (Fall 1998): 7-36.
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primary group level. Although it is easy to presume continuity with the
past, and indeed that connection is actively imagined by today’s service
personnel, cohesion in a professional force takes on a markedly different
character to that in a mass citizen army, where opportunities for training
and preparation were extremely limited.
While no one would deny the intense bonds often evident among
professional soldiers today, scholars have increasingly argued that the
performance of today’s professional troops does not only, nor even primarily, depend upon their personal friendships (deep though these may
be).8 On the contrary, collective combat performance—cohesion—relies
more on training and professional competence. Accordingly, individuals
are judged not so much on their personal characteristics but their professional ability and they are accepted into the section, platoon, or company
on this basis. Reflecting this changing ethos in the armed forces, there
has been increasingly heated debate among scholars about the primary
basis of cohesion. Some scholars have continued to emphasize social
cohesion based on the intimate bonds of friendship among soldiers.9
Yet, increasingly, scholars have stressed impersonal task-cohesion in
which solidarity depends on the requirements of immediate goals, not
friendship. The social identities of soldiers, and especially their social
homogeneity, is less important than whether each fulfills his or her allotted role. Whether they can do the job is more important than likeness;
that is, whether soldiers like each other and are like each other.10 Indeed,
American soldiers increasingly understand themselves in this way. In his
widely read account of US paratroopers in the Korengal Valley in 200708, Sebastian Junger records a peculiar kind of comradeship among 2nd
Platoon, Battle Company, 173rd Airborne Brigade. In the course of a
narrative ostensibly dedicated to extolling brotherly cohesion, Sergeant
O’Byrne (one of the central figures in Junger’s account) made a surprising admission. Rather than expatiating on his soldiers’ love for each
other, he observed: “There are guys in the platoon who straight up hate
each other.”11 Yet O’Byrne noted a paradox: “But they would also die
for each other. So you kind of have to ask, ‘How much could I really
hate the guy?’”12 The paradox is interesting but can be resolved if it
8     Hew Strachan, “Training, Morale and Modern War,” Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 2
(April 2006): 211–27; Uli Ben-Shalom, Zeev Lehrer, and Eyal Ben-Ari, “Cohesion During Military
Operations: A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada,” Armed Forces and Society 32, 32,
no. 1 (October 2005): 63-79; Anthony King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011); Anthony King, “The Word of Command: Communication and
Cohesion in the Military,” Armed Forces and Society 32, no. 4 (July 2006): 493-512; Anthony King, The
Combat Soldier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Edward Coss, All for the King’s Shilling: The
British Soldier Under Wellington, 1808-1814 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010).
9     Leonard Wong et al., Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003); Guy Siebold, “The Essence of Military
Group Cohesion,” Armed Forces and Society 33, no. 2 (January 2007): 286-295; Guy Siebold and D.
Kelly, Development of the Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for
the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Manpower and Personnel Laboratory, 1988).
10     Elizabeth Kier, “Homosexuality in the US Military: Open Integration and Combat
Effectiveness,” International Security 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 5-39; Robert J. MacCoun, Elizabeth Kier,
and Aaron Belkin, “Does Social Cohesion Determine Motivation in Combat?: An Old Question
with an Old Answer,” Armed Forces and Society 32, no. 4 (July 2006): 646-654; Robert MacCoun,
“What is Known About Unit Cohesion and Military Performance,” in Sexual Orientation and US
Military Personnel Policy: Options and Assessments, National Defense Research Institute (Washington,
DC: RAND, 1993); D. R. Segal and M. Kestnbaum, “Professional Closure in the Military Market: A
Critique of Pure Cohesion,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. D. M. Snider and G. L. Watkins
(New York: McGraw Hill, 2002).
11     Sebastian Junger, War (London: Fourth Estate, 2010), 79.
12     Ibid, 79.
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is recognized that among these professional soldiers cohesion was not
necessarily dependent on personal affection; it was based on competence. Specifically, in combat, Junger’s paratroopers united around their
training, their drills, and the execution of these collective practices,
whatever their personal differences. Bound by professional pride, they
performed together; they did not need to like each other personally.

Professionalized Cohesion

There is some evidence that the phenomenon of professionalized cohesion has intensified in the last decade. In their work on the
Israel Defense Force (IDF) in Second Intifada, Eyal Ben-Ari et al made
an important and perhaps surprising observation. Organic Israeli
combat units were reassembled and merged due to the exigencies of
specific missions and troop availability; “the units were split time and
time again—battalions into companies and companies into platoons
and sometimes squads.”13 In place of social familiarity, IDF soldiers
relied on swift trust to generate cohesion. They were able to cooperate
with each other by reference to common tactics and procedures and
adduced whether their new partners were competent and trustworthy
in executing these tactics by means of accelerated processes of mutual
testing.14 “Instead of cohesion based on face-to-face ties and long-term,
stable relations, the Israeli military created rather loose, ad-hoc coalitions for specific tasks.”15 Significantly, and against the classical theory
of military cohesion, swift trust seemed to be as effective as deep social
cohesion: “troops do not necessarily know each other, but the variety of
capabilities, equipment, and perspectives they bring to missions allows
much flexibility and the use of the lethal potential of the military to its
fullest potential.”16 Indeed, the deepened professional solidarity which
Ben-Ari et al have observed in the IDF seems to have been very evident
among western troops in Afghanistan and Iraq with the emergence of
“Forward Operating Base (FOB) cohesion”: that is, an impersonal cohesion among individual soldiers who patrol together but who may have
had very little prior social contact. Western soldiers are very aware of
the changing basis of solidarity on the frontline and, in interviews, were
explicit about the transformation:
There is no longer the need for section level cohesion. You go out with
a platoon consisting of various elements; there is Patrol Based cohesion.
There is FOB cohesion. From a psychological perspective, friendship is
developed by professionalism not because someone is in your section.17

The rise of impersonal professional cohesion has been important to
the armed forces but it may also be critical to the question of gender integration in the infantry. Although great care needs to be taken, the rise
of an impersonal professional ethos suggests that (a very small minority
of physically capable) women could be incorporated into the infantry.
Women might be integrated into the infantry if they are judged like
their male peers purely on their performance, not their gender, just as
13     Eyal Ben-Ari et al., Rethinking Contemporary Warfare: A Sociological View of the Al-Aqsa Intifada
(New York: SUNY Press, 2010), 74.
14     Ibid, 81.
15     Ibid, 87.
16     Ibid, 87.
17     OPTAG team, interview by author, Camp Bastion Helmand, Afghanistan, June 27, 2010.
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ethnic minorities and gay men have been before them. Arbitrary social
criteria became less important for inclusion than competence. Indeed,
there is some evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan this is precisely what
has happened.

Successful Integration

There have been a number of successful instances of integration
in the United States, although precisely because they remain so few
in number, the evidence tends to consist of a series of individual case
studies. Nevertheless, these cases are informative. Clearly, great care
needs to be taken with the necessarily small sample which the armed
forces and academics have at their disposal to assess female integration. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the official rule (rescinded in 2011) on
women’s exclusion from combat units was regularly breached by the
semantic method of describing female soldiers working on the frontline
as attached rather than assigned to combat units. In the close confines of a
patrol base or FOB, the distinction was academic. Indeed many female
soldiers noted the distinction is unsustainable and by any coherent standard women have served in combat for the last decade. These women
have understood their integration as a process of professionalizing. For
instance, Captain Tammy Duckworth, an army aviator who lost both
legs when her Black Hawk was downed in Iraq, has noted the commandments from the Soldier’s Creed that “I will always place the mission first,
I will never quit, I will never accept defeat,” and “I will never leave a
fallen comrade” are gender-neutral statements that get to the heart of
what it is to be an American soldier today.18 Significantly, Duckworth
defines women’s role in professional terms: “This is our job . . . we’re
there [on the frontline] and there to stay.”19
As Duckworth suggests, there have been a number of successful
cases of mixed gender cohesion in combat operations, facilitated by the
professional ethos of the US military where attached women are judged
on the basis of their competence, not their sex. In the last ten years, a
growing body of evidence provided by journalistic accounts and personal memoirs attests to this professionalized accession. These resources
must be treated with some care as it is not always easy to corroborate
the evidence presented in them. However, the best sources are at least
as reliable as interviews or survey techniques and they have become a
useful, if not definitive, archive of the experiences of American women
in combat, especially when negotiating access into the US military is
difficult. The journalist and former servicewoman Erin Solaro has
provided some insightful material here. She noted that military policewomen were successfully attached to a special operations forces (SOF)
unit in the Parwan in Afghanistan. These women found the SOF teams
highly professional in their orientation and were willing to accept female
soldiers on a professional basis.20 In addition, she observed the women
of the First Engineers, 101st Forward Support Battalion, known as the
“lionesses.” They were regularly posted to combat units as attachments
and were an interesting example of gender integration in combat. The
18     Kirsten Holmstedt, Band of Sisters: American Women in Iraq (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole
Books, 2007), vii.
19     Ibid., xxiii.
20     Ibid., 115-121.
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commanding officer of a battalion to which “lionesses” were attached
observed the appearance of women in the combat zone with striking
phlegmatism: “I don’t think this is a door-opening experiment, what
we’ve done here. It can’t be used as the only case study for women in
combat, but it is an interesting chapter.”21
Similarly, in her unvarnished memoir, Kayla Williams, a military
intelligence linguist specialist, was attached to the 101st Airborne
Division in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. She had a number of difficult experiences due to her sex but she also provides clear evidence of the possibility
of competent women integrating with combat units. She stressed how
she had tried to meet the male standards for physical training and
avoided any fraternizing while on operations, believing that both were
crucial to her being accepted as a professional.22 Indeed, on an operation
with a fire support team observing the Syrian border from a high point,
she won the respect of that all-male team by driving her vehicle to the
observation post up a dangerously steep and rocky incline while her
male colleagues, afraid for their safety, had dismounted and walked.23
In Baghdad, she worked closely with Delta Company 1/187th Airborne
Infantry. At the end of the tour, members of this unit who had worked
with her went to great lengths to find her before she left to personally
award her an Army Commendation Medal. The sergeant who presented
the award observed: “In recognition of your work with us back in the
spring . . . for service above and beyond . . . you really deserve it.” Williams
was gratified by the acknowledgement of the infantry who almost never
recognize support elements.24 These male soldiers respected her and the
work she did for them; she was not discriminated against because of
her sex. Reflecting this sense of integration, it is interesting to note her
final dedication: “I want to thank the wonderful men and women with
whom I served—and who serve today.”25 Williams experienced some
of the most intense problems of a mixed-gender force in combat and
yet, at the end of her work, she recalls only the comradeship—male and
female—she experienced in Iraq.
Similar processes of de facto integration have been evident in the US
Marine Corps (USMC). A Marine major, serving in Regional Command
Southwest Afghanistan in 2010, noted that the US Marines had developed a female engagement program with a platoon of specially trained
female Marines. These female Marines were embedded in combat units
and had gone on patrols and operations with Marine infantry units.26
He emphasized, however, that the USMC is pretty tight overall: men
and women unite. He had some scepticism whether female integration
in the infantry would work but he provided clear evidence of females
operating with the infantry on the frontline. While maintaining the ban
on women in the infantry, senior United States Marine officers have
explicitly emphasized the importance of training and professionalism in
integrating women into the Corps. For instance, discussing integrated
21     Ibid., 100.
22     Kayla Williams and Michael Schaub, Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the US
Army (London: Weidenfield and Micolson, 2006), 44, 20.
23     Ibid., 161.
24     Ibid., 227-8.
25     Ibid., 289.
26     Interview with Major, USMC, June 27, 2010.
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training including the US Marines training exercise, the Crucible,
Lieutenant General Van Riper observed: “The key to building effective,
cohesive, gender integrated operational units is in creating a training
environment that builds progressively to that end.”27 The result of this
has been “Marines [male and female] see themselves as members of the
same team committed to performing the same tough duties in the same
dirty, mentally and physically demanding environment, and from that
experience develop an appreciation of each other as professionals.”28
Indeed, there have been a number of examples of female and male
Marines not simply serving together on operations but fighting together
in combat. Marine Corporals Carrie Blaise and Priscilla Kispetik were
attached to 3/25 Lima Company US Marines in 2005 in Haditha where
they were assigned to patrols on house-clearing missions; as females
they were able to interact with women and facilitate unforced entries at
various points. Although Blaise and Kispetik believed that “they were
Marines and every Marine (male or female) was a rifleman,” their initial
reception was hostile; male Marines were “disappointed” to be serving
with women in Haditha.29 However, later in the tour, the observation
that all Marines whether male or female were riflemen became a reality.
On 26 May 2005, the platoon to which Blaise and Kispetik were assigned
was ambushed by insurgents as it cleared Haqlaniya; two Marines were
killed by a rocket propelled grenade in the initial contact and the rest
eventually trapped in a school. The platoon had to fight hard merely to
survive with almost all its members involved in this firefight. Blaise was
on the second floor, with a good field of vision, and was, therefore, able
to identify a male Iraqi with a weapon approximately 400 meters away.
Blaise was ordered to engage by her staff sergeant. She shot two rounds,
killing the Iraqi:
Nice job he [the staff sergeant] yelled. . . . The staff sergeant must have
known it was the lance corporal’s first kill because he grabbed her Kevlar,
turned her head so she was facing him, looked into her eyes, and said, Think
of all the lives you just saved.30

Although troubled by the experience, Blaise recognized her status
in the Marines was significantly advanced by having a confirmed kill. In
training and on operations, gender barriers appear to be breaking down
in the United States and women are increasingly accepted by the infantry
(if not in the infantry) on the grounds of their performance.
In the United Kingdom, a similar reform in attitudes toward
women seems to be occurring, even among elite infantry such as the
Royal Marines and Parachute Regiment. Thus, a color sergeant believed
that women could serve in the Parachute Regiment, despite its selection
process and reputation, “as long as she passes the same course.” For
this soldier, it would be inappropriate to drop entry standards but “if
a woman had the same capability, why not?” 31 Across western forces,

27     Paul K. Van Riper, “Gender Integrated/Segregated Training,” Marine Corps Gazette 81
(November 1997): 65.
28     Ibid., 65.
29     Holmstedt, Band of Sisters, 5.
30     Ibid., 20.
31     Interview by author, June 27, 2010.
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there is evidence that professional competence is becoming more important than gender to status and role in the military.

Obstacles to Female Integration

Van Creveld et al may be assertive about the effect of women on
military performance and cohesion but, despite the changes documented above, the obstacles to female integration in the infantry are
manifest and it would be irresponsible not to recognize them. There is
considerable evidence many soldiers have been and are still opposed to
the presence of females. Masculine self-conceptions remain central to
the motivation of male soldiers. Despite extensive attempts to integrate
women since the 1970s, women constitute only 15 percent of the US
armed forces and it seems unlikely this figure will increase in the future
significantly—even after total female accession. The armed forces are
and will remain overwhelmingly male organizations. As a result, in
her work on female integration, Judith Stiehm appositely asked: “How
can one distinguish between male culture and military culture?”32 The
problem of creating gender equality in organizations where women
are a small minority has exercised a number of feminist scholars and
Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s research on female corporate employment is
one of the most insightful in this regard. Kanter is highly sensitive to
the different dynamics which alternate gender proportions generate and
she highlights the special problems which arise when women are badly
outnumbered. Indeed, for Kanter, a female workforce of 15 percent or
less constitutes not even a genuine minority but merely a token. As a
token, it would seem plausible to predict women would find it difficult
to integrate into the overwhelmingly male and very masculine military.
This token status is compounded by cultural factors. Kanter suggests
that the putatively rational modern western organizations have, in fact,
always involved and presumed a “masculine ethic.”33 In modern western
culture, men have been conceived as cognitively superior in problemsolving and decisionmaking while women have been represented
as emotional, sensitive, and caring, in line with their maternal role.34
Consequently, women have been impeded from participation at the
higher levels of management; the masculine ethic has been invoked as
an exclusionary principle. For Kanter, male managers engage in “homosocial reproduction.”35 In the face of organizational uncertainty and
“the need for smooth communication,”36 male managers prioritize trust
and mutual understanding which is primarily presumed on the basis of
similarity of social background and similarity of organizational experience: “People [i.e. women] who do not ‘fit in’ by social characteristics to
the homogenous management group tend to be clustered in those parts
of management with the least uncertainty.”37
The processes which Kanter identified in the corporate sector have
often taken a more extreme form in the armed forces. In her important
32     Judith Hicks Stiehm, Bring Me Men & Women (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1981), 65.
33     Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 22.
34     Ibid., 22-25.
35     Ibid., 48.
36     Ibid., 55.
37     Ibid., 55.
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work on integration in the 1980s, Judith Hicks Stiehm recorded extreme
forms of bullying, harassment, and sexual abuse (including rape) among
the US armed forces.38 The Tailhook and Aberdeen Proving Ground
scandals in the 1990s remain infamous episodes, but routine bullying,
abuse, and assault were widespread at the time. The problem is evident
today. Erin Solaro, a journalist who had previously served in the armed
forces, describes the actions as those of the small percentage of real
criminals or others who think their manhood depends upon women’s
subordination.39 Indeed, during her research in Iraq, Solaro felt physically
threatened by certain men while staying in transit accommodation.40 Yet,
it is not perhaps the extremists who are the most damaging or important constituency here. The everyday attitudes of male soldiers are likely
to be more important in undermining female integration; for Kanter,
homosocial reproduction does not primarily work through dramatic
and public forms of denigration but through microsocial mechanisms of
quiet social marginalization from often trivial forms of communion—
the cigarette or coffee break, the side chat, or playing sports together.
The recognition of these discriminatory processes does not justify them
nor can it be used as evidence that women should be excluded no more
than the existence of racism in the US Army in the 1940s and 1950s was
a legitimate reason for excluding black American soldiers from combat
units. Yet these cultural realities are likely to complicate the accession of
women into the infantry.
With growing professionalism and changing gender norms in civil
society, it might be possible for overt and covert forms of discrimination to be reduced. It might be possible to condition even the most
discriminatory men to accept women. Yet no amount of gender education—however successful—will overcome two central obstacles to
female accession identified by van Creveld and Frum: the disparity in
mean physical performance between men and women and the problem of
sexual attraction. Physiological differences remain an enduring problem.
Indeed, even Judith Stiehm, an advocate of integration, has noted the
physical disparity between men and women. In the early 1980s, the
highest women’s score on the West Point physical fitness test would have
been a man’s C- and 87 percent of women would have failed.41 There
is little evidence this physical disparity between the average female and
average male performance has changed significantly in the last three
decades. A British Ministry of Defence Report based on extensive physiological testing concluded: “approximately 1 percent of women can equal
the performance of the average man . . . .” The study concluded “about
0.1 per cent of the female applicants and 1 percent of trained female
soldiers would reach the required standards to meet the demands of
these [combat] roles.”42 On purely physiological grounds, the exclusion
of women from the infantry is still seen by many as appropriate, even
necessary: “Why would you voluntarily want to make your units weaker
38     Judith Stiehm, Arms and the Enlisted Woman (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2010),
250.
39     Erin Solaro, Women in the Line of Fire: What You Should Know About Women in the Military
(Emeryville, CA: Seal Press, 2006), 38.
40     Ibid, 39-40.
41     Stiehm, Bring Me Men & Women, 166.
42     Ministry of Defence. Women in the Armed Forces (London: Directorate of Service Personnel
Policy Service Conditions, 2002),4.
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when you are going into combat?”43 The vast majority of women cannot
be combat soldiers. Indeed, Sergeant Lizette Leblanc, one of the most
successful female Canadian infantry soldiers, noted that the ratio of men
to women in her regiment during some periods of her service has been
one to a thousand; she was often the only woman.

The Issue of Sexuality

Sexuality is also a problem. A reservist, Jason Hartley, who served
in Iraq in 2004, recorded the rise of a professionalized form of cohesion
in his unit before deployment but, despite his liberal political views, he
articulated a commonly held view about women in combat. For him,
women cannot be in the infantry (not only because they are not strong
enough) but because it undermines masculine motivations for combat:
the main reason they [soldiers] fight is to be tough and therefore attract
more women. The presence of women consequently corrodes the very
possibility of cohesion: “As soon as there are any women within spittin’
distance, prime directive number one [sexual desire] kicks in, and all
things, especially job discipline go straight to hell.”44 James Webb, a
retired US Marine officer and former secretary of the Navy, has made
the same point differentiating ethnic integration from gender integration precisely because of the attraction between the sexes: “No edict
will ever eliminate sexual activity when men and women are thrust
together at close quarters.”45 The problem here is that the presence of a
female in the ranks undermines the unity among male soldiers. Instead
of focusing on their collective mission, they compete with each other
for the sexual attentions of the female(s). Egalitarian solidarity, in which
all soldiers are treated the same and everyone relates to everyone else
as equals, is replaced by rivalry. Many soldiers have seen precisely this
process at work when females have been attached to them. Indeed, many
officers opposed the general principle of female integration because they
had witnessed cases of fraternization and its nefarious effects. A British
captain who had served in a reconnaissance unit in Helmand confirmed
the point; whenever women had been attached to his subunit, they had
slept with his soldiers to the detriment of unit cohesion.46
Canadian female soldiers have themselves identified fraternization
as extremely dangerous for the women who engage in it: “no matter how
competent you are, if you sleep around, you will ruin your reputation,
not only your own but of all women.”47 American servicewomen have
made precisely the same observation. Williams recorded the promiscuity
of one woman in her unit whose behavior “made it easy for guys over
there to treat females as if they were less reliable.”48 Indeed, overly feminized female soldiers were seen as a threat. “When I saw a woman in
uniform with too much make-up. . . . I was prejudiced. . . . As though all
my fight to be seen as a competent, goal-oriented officer was denigrated
by her obvious sexual appearance.”49 Evidence suggests that female
43     Interview with Major, US Army, March 15, 2010.
44     Jason Hartley, Just Another Soldier: A Year on the Ground in Iraq (London: New York, 2005), 93.
45     James J. Buckley, “The Unit Cohesion Factor,” Marine Corps Gazette 81 (November 1997): 69.
46     Interview by author, March 7, 2013.
47     Interview with Captain A, Canadian Army, October 17, 2011.
48     Williams, Love My Rifle, 14.
49     Melissa S. Herbert, Camouflage Isn’t Only for Combat: Gender, Sexuality, and Women in the Military
(New York, NYU Press), 67.

Women in Battle

King

23

soldiers have to abjure from any sexual contact within their unit if they
are to preserve their professional reputation. Indeed, even friendship
with individual male soldiers had to be treated with care since it might
be interpreted as a sexual relation and the reputational consequences
for women equally catastrophic. The problem with fraternization for
women is it inscribes civilian gender norms onto military relations, stripping the female involved of her professional status. She becomes once
again just a woman; she cannot, therefore, be treated as a soldier and
can no longer be the peer, still less the commander, of male troops. By
contrast, and indicating a potential double standard, precisely because
of the dominant masculine culture of the armed forces, male soldiers
engaging in fraternization are rarely subject to this loss of credibility.
They may engage in sexual relations with female soldiers (and, therefore,
be equally responsible for undermining cohesion) and yet retain their
reputation as professional soldiers. At the same time, although fraternization may be a problem, it is not an inevitability. Female soldiers who
served on the frontline in Afghanistan reported that in patrol bases, the
very fact that everyone lived so close together in arduous conditions
meant neither males nor females had the time or inclination to engage
in fraternization. In this situation, women became like “sisters” rather
than potential sexual partners.
Indeed, the problem of sexuality far exceeds the issue of consensual
fraternization and its effect on the credibility of women soldiers. The
masculinized culture of the military may represent a structural impediment to female integration; because of sexualized male presumptions, it
may be impossible for women to be treated as equals in the armed forces.
Despite the advances which American service personnel have made in
the last ten years, fraternization, harassment, and abuse have been widely
recorded and these incidents do not appear as random occurrences. Kayla
Williams records her attempts to conduct herself professionally in Iraq
in 2005 and there is some evidence that male soldiers she served with
regarded her highly. Yet, she also concluded on the basis of her service
that sex is key to any woman soldier’s experience in the American military. However professional a woman might be, relationships with male
soldiers were finally determined by their sexual availability. At its mildest,
Williams was subject to the invasive stares of male soldiers throughout
her tour, numerous lewd propositions, and an indecent assault when a
soldier exposed himself to her and tried to force her to gratify him while
on sentry.50 She suggested that, because it is a primarily male organization with a strongly masculine culture, women were either classified as
“sluts” (they were open to sexual advances) or “bitches” (they were not).
Others have confirmed the point noting, in addition, that “bitches” were
often accordingly denigrated as lesbians in the US military.51 Indeed, in
her invective against the US military and its failure to accord women
true professional status while putting them into combat situations, Helen
Benedict cites an informant who recorded that so irredeemably masculinized are the armed forces that “there are only three things the guys
let you be if you’re a girl in the military . . . a bitch, a ho or a dyke.”52
50     Williams, Love My Rifle, 22, 72, 199, 207.
51     Ibid., 212.
52     Helen Benedict, The Lonely Soldier: The Private War of Women Serving in Iraq (Boston: Beacon
Press, 2010), 6.
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Moreover, in order to assign women to one or other of these categories,
means false rumors about the sexual availability of women abound in the
US military to the detriment of their professional reputation.
Irrespective of the question of fraternization and outright sexual
discrimination, the female reproductive role and position as mothers
in civilian society generates additional questions which the armed
forces need to consider. In a professional army, where women may
serve as career soldiers from their late teens to early forties (i.e., during
the reproductive decades of adult life), the question of pregnancy and
motherhood is a critical—almost inevitable—one. The only historical
precedent is unhelpful. From 1727 to 1892, the Dahomey Kingdom
of West Africa recruited, trained, and deployed an all-female combat
unit (an “Amazon Corps”) as part of its standing army.53 The women
in this formation were equipped with muskets and swords, were drilled
regularly and, according to western observers, physically resembled
men in size, musculature, and demeanor.54 Crucially, they were sworn
to celibacy on pain of death. The Dahomey rulers obviated the problem
of pregnancy for their women soldiers simply by outlawing all sexual
activity. Such a policy is impossible among western forces but some
strategy is likely to be necessary regarding pregnancy and childbearing.
Civil society is now sufficiently mature enough to accept the combatrelated deaths of female soldiers who happen to be mothers; certainly,
the reporting of male and female deaths in the last ten years has been
noticeably similar.55 Yet, issues remain. Female soldiers have sometimes
been accused of becoming pregnant to avoid operations and unplanned
pregnancies (the result of fraternization) have meant women had to be
sent home from operations. In fact, excluding females from the infantry
on the basis that a small number of women may have missed operations
because they got pregnant (accidentally or not) does not seem particularly
defensible; many male soldiers have avoided combat for often specious
medical reasons. The real issue seems to be planned pregnancies with
the inevitable gaps in service and possible unavailability of women for
operations. Pregnancy is not an insurmountable obstruction, but in preparing for women’s integration into the career structure of the infantry,
it is an issue.

Conclusion

In the First and Second World Wars, black American soldiers were
regularly declared, on apparently scientific grounds, incapable of fighting. Presumptions about their inadequacies quickly evaporated—and
indeed looked very foolish—when black soldiers were fully integrated
during the Korean War.56 The case of women in the military has some
parallels. In an all-volunteer force where cohesion is based on the impersonal criteria of competence rather than inherited social ascriptions,
capable and proven women may serve no less effectively than black
Americans before them.
53     Joshua Goldstein, War and Gender (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 61-4.
54     Ibid., 61-4.
55     Anthony King, “The Afghan War and ‘Postmodern’ Memory: Commemoration and the Dead
of Helmand,” British Journal of Sociology 61(1) 2010: 1-25; Anthony King, The Combat Soldier.
56     Bernard Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (London: Collier
Macmillan, 1989); Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Colour Lines (Baltimore, MD:
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Yet, van Creveld’s challenge also usefully demands that the conditions for and limitations of women’s participation be recognized
especially given that, unlike African-American men, women are physiologically different from men. If women, like ethnic minorities and
gays before them, are to be integrated into the infantry, they have to be
selected to the same standards as men. Gender-blind testing is essential
but this necessarily means that a minuscule proportion of the combat
arms will be female in the future. Physically, most women will be incapable of passing the selection tests for the infantry. Currently, just over
15 percent of the Canadian armed forces are women, but less than 1
percent of the infantry is female. Women’s integration in the combat
arms may be possible but it is likely to involve a tiny number of women.
Accordingly, despite the undoubted importance of Panetta’s announcement, the formal lifting of the ban on female service in the combat
arms is unlikely to alter the culture or everyday reality of life in the US
Army and US Marines to any great extent. Women have already been
operating with the combat arms in numbers that will not drastically
change after 2016. The legislation does little more than recognize in
law a de facto reality. Yet this legal recognition is important for women
because it is likely to be beneficial to the status of female soldiers. Of
equal importance, it may advance the professionalism of the United
States Army and Marines for whom objective standards of competence
become finally and definitively the universal and ubiquitous reference
point for all service personnel, whatever their race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, or sexuality.

